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Abstract—We introduce a system for automatically generating
warnings of imminent or current cyber-threats. Our system
leverages the communication of malicious actors on the darkweb,
as well as activity of cyber security experts on social media
platforms like Twitter. In a time period between September, 2016
and January, 2017, our method generated 661 alerts of which
about 84% were relevant to current or imminent cyber-threats.
In the paper, we first illustrate the rationale and workflow of
our system, then we measure its performance. Our analysis is
enriched by two case studies: the first shows how the method
could predict DDoS attacks, and how it would have allowed
organizations to prepare for the Mirai attacks that caused
widespread disruption in October 2016. Second, we discuss
the method’s timely identification of various instances of data
breaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 2016, hundreds of popular Websites, in-
cluding Twitter, Netflix, and Paypal, became unreachable due
to a massive cyber-attack directed against the infrastructure
of the Internet. Attackers exploited a vulnerability in the
software used by Internet of Things (IoT) devices that en-
abled them to commandeer a vast number of such devices.
Attackers, then, used this so called botnet to unleash a massive
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against Dyn, a
popular domain name system (DNS) services provider. The
overwhelmed Dyn DNS servers stopped routing Internet traffic
effectively, resulting in widespread disruption of the involved
Websites and therefore massive economic damage 1. Despite
the suddenness of the attack, there were signals indicating the
availability of the IoT botnet in question as well as evidence
of threat actors willing to employ this platform prior to the
attack. This could have given decision makers key warnings
to prepare for the imminent exploit.
To conduct a cyber-attack, malicious actors typically have to
1) identify vulnerabilities, 2) acquire the necessary tools and
tradecraft to successfully exploit them, 3) choose a target and
recruit participants, 4) create or purchase the infrastructure
*A. Sapienza and A. Bessi contributed equally to this work.
1https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/a-lot/505025/
needed, and 5) plan and execute the attack. Other actors—
system administrators, security analysts, and even victims—
may discuss vulnerabilities or coordinate a response to attacks.
These activities are often conducted online through social
media, (open and dark) Web forums, and professional blogs,
leaving digital traces behind. Collectively, these digital traces
provide valuable insights into evolving cyber-threats and can
signal a pending or developing attack well before malicious
activity is noted on a target system. For example, exploits are
discussed on Twitter before they are publicly disclosed [1] and
on darkweb forums even before they are discussed on social
media [2].
Here, we introduce a lightweight framework that leverages
online social media sensors such as Twitter and darkweb
forums, to generate alerts that function as early warnings of
cyber-threats. The system monitors social media feeds of a
number of prominent security researchers, analysts, and white-
hat hackers, scanning for posts (tweets) related to exploits,
vulnerabilities, and other relevant cyber-security topics. After-
wards, it applies text mining techniques to identify important
terms and remove irrelevant ones. Then, the system verifies
whether the terms that were identified during the filtering
stage have ever been used in darkweb hacking forums, and
eventually reports the volume of mentions as well as the con-
tent of posts. Such information might be extremely valuable,
since mentions that have been found by the algorithm might
point to links to stolen credentials as well as threads where
a novel vulnerability is discussed along with source codes
aiming at exploiting it. Our framework relies on a database,
updated daily, of posts published on nearly 200 darkweb and
deepweb hacking forums and marketplaces [3]–[5]. Finally,
the system generates warnings for the newly discovered terms,
along with their frequency of appearance on social media and
darkweb, the contents of possible mentions found in darkweb
and deepweb, and a collection of words providing semantic
context for facilitating situational awareness and interpretation
of the warning. The algorithm design allows for generation of
additional warnings over the same time period. This choice is
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due to the willingness to keep track of the attention around the
possible cyber-threat, and in particular to monitor the evolution
of darkweb activities related to the discovered terms.
To test the precision of the method we collected warnings
generated between September 1, 2016 and January 31, 2017.
Then, we asked to 5 human annotators with knowledge of
cyber-security to independently annotate each warning as a
legitimate cyber-threat or a false alarm (see Section III for
additional details). We found that about 84% of the total
generated warnings were related to imminent or current cyber-
threats, whereas the vast majority of false alarms were due
to foreign languages terms (e.g. German) or terms related to
cyber-security yet too generic to be considered as imminent or
current threats. In future versions of our algorithm, the number
of false alarms could be reduced by adding dictionaries and
updating the existing ones. The average time required to
complete its entire workflow—from data retrieval to warning
generation—is only 0.6 seconds. This makes our system
amenable to real-time monitoring of multiple online platforms
for imminent cyber-threats. Indeed, our system currently runs
continuously in a cloud environment: all data are stored on
Amazon EC2 and retrieved via Elastic Search, an open source
distributed search engine that provides a powerful, scalable,
and fast infrastructure for data retrieval. The endpoint of the
system is designed to deliver early warnings to analysts and
enable decision making allowing for preventive measures to
face incoming attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
illustrates and explains the algorithm, from data retrieval to
early-warnings generation. Section III is dedicated to the eval-
uation of its performance and discovery accuracy. In Section
IV, we consider two different case studies, showing the use
of the method to predict distributed denial of service attacks,
specifically Mirai, and to detect instances of data breaches.
Finally, in Section VI we discuss future improvements as well
as promising research directions.
II. METHOD
In this section we provide a detailed explanation of our
method, illustrating its workflow, from data retrieval to warn-
ing generation passing through data processing and sensor
fusion. To facilitate the comprehension of our framework,
we provide some practical examples throughout the section.
Moreover, Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the
system’s workflow.
A. Data Retrieval
We compiled a list of well known and reliable Twitter
experts who post frequently on issues related to cyber-security.
This manually curated list includes 69 international researchers
and security analysts associated with security firms, as well as
widely-followed whitehat hackers. The list can be arbitrarily
extended by including other experts with similar degree of
activity and trustworthiness. We hourly collect all tweets
posted in the previous 60 minutes by these experts. The tweets
are collected in real-time by means of Twitter API, stored
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Fig. 1. Workflow of the method.
in Amazon EC2, and retrieved using Elastic Search, an open
source search engine based on Apache Lucene that provides a
distributed, multitenant-capable full-text search with a schema-
free JSON documents.
Darkweb and deepweb crawling infrastructure.: We
briefly recap the infrastructure for crawling the darkweb and
deepweb originally introduced in [4], [5]. In this context, dark-
web refers to sites accessed through anonymization protocols
such as Tor and i2p, while deepweb refers to non-indexed sites
on the open Internet [6]. Our crawling infrastructure handles
sites of both types. The framework consists of an infrastructure
that enables lightweight crawlers and parsers that are focused
on specific sites. At the time of this writing, we have created
crawlers and parsers for a manually-compiled list of nearly
200 sites relating to malicious hacking and/or online financial
fraud, including fishing, spear-fishing, ransomware, credit card
frauds, etc. While our framework enables common crawling
and parsing tasks based on aspects such as protocol and site
structure, it remains imperative to use focused crawlers due
to the variety of sites. The use of customized parsers allow
information from a variety of websites to be stored in a
unified RDBMS schema which simplifies data cleaning [4],
tagging [7], and other analysis [8]. These steps help ensure that
the obtained data remains relevant to cyber-security use cases:
indeed, many darkweb and deepweb forums and marketplaces
also involve other illicit activities such as drug markets and
the sale of stolen goods. To interface with the remainder of
our method, we use a REST-based API, that allows to access
posts’ content and metadata such as publication date, authors’
usernames, authors’ reputations, etc.
B. Data Processing
After every iteration of the data collection, the tweets that
have been retrieved are pre-processed using traditional text
mining techniques: each tweet is lowercased, and numbers,
symbols, Twitter handles and URLs are removed. At the end
of this pre-processing stage, text is tokenized and all the tweets
collected are aggregated and reduced to a unique list of terms.
For example, on September 5th 2016, between 8am and 9am
GMT, a tweet that reads ”My interview to @MalwareMustDie
for @SecurityAffairs on a new Botnet targeting #IoT. Details
on #Mirai trojan #Linux ” has been retweeted seven times by
the cyber-security experts that our system is monitoring. These
seven identical tweets have been reduced to the following list
of terms: my, interview, to, for, on, a, new, botnet, targeting,
iot, details, mirai, trojan, linux.
Each execution of the data pre-processing stage results in a
very long list of terms, many of which are not related to cyber-
threats. To address this issue, our framework automatically
excludes any discovered term that appears in any of the
following dictionaries:
• english dictionary: 235, 892 common English
words—e.g. interview, new, details, ...;
• stopwords dictionary: 2, 390 stopwords (for En-
glish, German, Italian, French, etc.)—e.g. to, on, a, for,
...;
• technical dictionary: 57, 459 technical and
context-specific terms that have been used from January,
2013 to August, 2016 by cyber-security experts the al-
gorithm is monitoring—e.g. hacker, domain, dns, ...; we
manually created and curated this dictionary by analyzing
the past six and a half years of activity of such experts
on Twitter;
• threat dictionary: 25 general terms indicat-
ing known types of cyber-threats—e.g. ddos, phishing,
databreach, botnet, etc; we curated this list manually;
• italian dictionary: 129, 121 common Italian
words—e.g. intervista, attacco, spazio, ...—needed since
sometimes a few of the cyber-security experts tweet in
Italian; other non-English dictionaries may be also used
depending on the set of experts that the system leverages.
The four-stage filtering process allows the system to gener-
ate warnings only for terms that are likely to be related to new
cyber-threats. Using english dictionary, stopwords
dictionary, italian dictionary, we filter out com-
mon words that are unlikely to be related to cyber-threats;
whereas by means of the technical dictionary we
remove several context-specific words that have been used in
the past by the cyber-security experts that we are monitoring.
Finally, those words that do not co-occur with terms contained
in the threat dictionary are removed. This last stage
of the filtering process is necessary to avoid the generation of
warnings for words that because of their novelty are likely to
pass through the first three filtering stages—e.g. words related
to socio-political or novel trending topics discussed on Twitter.
Continuing the illustrative example, after the filtering pro-
cess, the original list of terms obtained by tokenizing tweets
has been reduced to a list containing only a single word:
mirai. The four-stage filtering process was able to filter out
common words (interview, new, details), stopwords (my, to,
for, on, a) and several context-specific words (targeting, botnet,
linux, trojan, iot) included in the dictionaries. Then, since the
unique word left, mirai, co-occurs with terms related to cyber-
threats included in the threat dictionary, the algorithm
proceeds to the third stage: sensor fusion.
C. Sensor Fusion
After raw data have been processed and irrelevant terms
filtered out, the algorithm verifies whether the newly discov-
ered terms have ever been used in a set of darkweb hacking
forums. In fact, our algorithm relies on an up-to-date collection
of all the posts that have been published in nearly 200 darkweb
hacking forums as well as social media. These posts are
stored in Amazon EC2 and retrieved using Elastic Search.
Continuing our example, in this stage the algorithm makes a
Elastic Search query to look for occurrences of the word mirai
throughout all the posts that have been published on deepweb
and darkweb forums. Eventually, the algorithm reports volume
and content of posts mentioning the discovered term, often
pointing either to links to stolen credentials or threads where
a novel vulnerability is discussed.
D. Warnings Generation
In the final stage, the algorithm generates alerts providing
some information related to it. Eventually, for each alert that
passed all the four filtering stages and that occurred more than
once in the observed period, the algorithm generates a warning
reporting:
• The term that has been discovered and that is likely to
be related to current or imminent cyber-threats;
• The number of times that the discovered term has been
mentioned on Twitter during the previous 60 minutes;
• The number of times that the discovered term has been
mentioned on deepweb and darkweb hacking forums and
marketplaces so far;
• The content of posts where the discovered term has been
mentioned on deepweb and darkweb hacking forums so
far;
• A collection of terms included in the threat
dictionary that co-occurred in the tweets mentioning
the discovered term. Such a collection of words provides
semantic context for situational awareness that facilitates
the interpretation of the generated warning.
Continuing our example, the warning that has been gener-
ated after data processing and sensor fusion is:
• time: current time;
• threat: mirai;
• frequency on Twitter: 7;
• frequency on Darknet/Deepweb: 0;
• posts on Darknet/Deepweb: empty;
• context: botnet, linux, iot, trojan.
III. PRECISION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the accuracy of our framework, we ran it from
September 1, 2016 to January 31, 2017 and collected all the
warnings that have been generated during that period. Then,
we asked to 5 annotators with extensive knowledge in cyber-
security to independently annotate each warning as legitimate
cyber-threat or false alarm. Annotators were instructed to
Fig. 2. Number of warnings generated on a daily basis, along with their precision, the average fraction of experts agreeing on false alarms, and the
amount of related tweets and darknet posts. Main events related to different types of attack are also annotated on the timeline.
annotator threats false alarm precision (%)
1 540 121 81.69
2 532 129 80.48
3 565 96 85.48
4 534 127 80.79
5 578 83 87.44
TABLE I
ALGORITHM’S PRECISION ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT ANNOTATORS.
mark a warning as legitimate cyber-threat if and only if the
discovered word was strongly related to imminent or current
cyber-threats. The annotators were further instructed about the
possibility of using Google search to try identify attacks that
occurred before, during, or after the warning generation time
involving the specific threat. This enhanced the annotator’s
ability to determine whether the warning generated by our
system was correlated to an actual attack or just a spurious
coincidence (e.g., an old news regarding some old threat was
retweeted and became contemporary even though no current
or future threat occurred).
Over this period, the algorithm generated 661 alerts, of
which about 84% have been considered legitimate cyber-
threats, from data breaches to novel vulnerabilities, by the
majority (i.e. at least 3) of the annotators. Table I reports
precision according to each annotator.
Warnings annotated as false alarms were mostly represented
by terms too generic to be considered legitimate cyber-threats
or foreign language terms. Notice that the performance of
our algorithm could be improved using additional dictionaries
(e.g., other foreign languages) or adding new words to existent
dictionaries.
Figure 2 shows the number of warnings generated along
with the average fraction of experts agreeing on false alarms,
and the number of related posts occurring on Twitter and
on the Darknet/Deepweb. For each day, we also show the
achieved discover precision. Table II shows some popular
cyber-threats for which the algorithm generated several warn-
ings. In particular, the algorithm found malware and ran-
domware softwares, such as gooligan and luabot, both asso-
ciated with disruptive attacks occurred during our observation
period; vulnerabilities such as Mirai; and data breaches such as
AdultFriendFinder, and BrazzersForum, which we will discuss
in the following section.
Concerning the execution performance, the average time
required to complete the entire workflow—from data retrieval
to warning generation—is 0.6 seconds. Such a fast execution
time is guaranteed by streamlining its entire workflow by
means of Elastic Search, a distributed search engine that
provides a powerful, scalable, and fast infrastructure for data
retrieval.
IV. SCENARIO ANALYSIS
In this section we provide evidences of the effectiveness of
our method. In particular, we analyze two different scenarios,
showing how our algorithm is able to identify imminent and
current cyber-threats:
• Vulnerabilities: we will discuss how the method can
be effectively used to timely predicting vulnerabilities
that can be exploited in association with future cyber
attacks. We will focus on the most prominent event
during our analysis period (September 1, to January 31,
2017), namely Mirai and the disruption of the Dyn DNS
operations occurred in October 2016;
• Data breaches: we will demonstrate how the method
timely identified the availability of leaked data on dark-
web/deepweb, as a consequence of data breaches due to
cyber attacks; we will cover two instances of such data
breaches, namely the publication on the darkweb of sen-
Fig. 3. Timeline of Mirai warnings.
discovered type of number of mentions on mentions on
word threat warnings twitter darkweb
mirai vulnerability 94 537 85
teamxrat ransomware 13 30 0
luabot trojan 12 27 0
cryptoluck ransomware 12 29 0
clixsense data breach 12 26 5
gooligan malware 9 26 0
usbee malware 9 18 0
adultfriendfinder data breach 9 23 0
starhub data breach 9 82 0
badepilogue malware 8 21 0
evony data breach 8 25 0
TABLE II
TOP CYBER-THREATS ANTICIPATED BY THE METHOD.
sitive data on users of two platforms, AdultFriendFinder,
and BrazzersForum.
A. Vulnerabilities
a) Mirai.: In the introduction of this paper we mentioned
the attack perpetrated on October 21, 2016 towards Dyn, a
popular domain name system services provider. In this section
we show how our algorithm generated warnings that could
have allowed the organization to anticipate and prepare for
the attack.
The first warnings related to the vulnerability that eventually
led to the aforementioned cyber attack were generated on
September 5, 2016 between 7am and 9am GMT. A tweet
linking to a blog post describing a vulnerability in the operat-
ing system of Internet of Things (IoT) devices was retweeted
several times by the monitored cyber-security experts. Our
algorithm generated two warnings for the term mirai on that
morning. The warnings generated by our system showed that
the term mirai was mentioned 14 times between 7am and 9am
GMT of September 5, 2016 along with terms related to cyber-
threats such as malware, botnet, linux, iot, trojan.
Mirai is a malware that turns computer systems running
Linux—primarily IoT devices such as remote camera and
home routers—into remotely controlled bots, that can be used
as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks. Devices
infected by Mirai continuously scan and identify further vul-
nerable IoT devices using a table of more than 60 common
factory default usernames and passwords; once a vulnerable
device is identified, Mirai logs into it and infects it with a
copy of its malware. Infected devices will continue to function
normally, except for an increased use of bandwidth, associated
to the scanning activity, and/or the execution of distributed
denial of service attacks (DDoS). There are hundreds of
thousands of IoT devices that use default settings, making
them vulnerable to infection. Once infected, the device will
monitor a command and control server which indicates the
target of an attack. The use of a large number of IoT devices
allows to bypass some anti-DDoS software which monitors
the IP address of incoming requests and filters or sets up a
block if it identifies an abnormal traffic pattern—e.g. if too
many requests come from a particular IP address. Moreover,
a large number of different infected device can provide more
bandwidth than the perpetrator can assemble alone, as well as
reduce the chance of being traced.
On October 1, the algorithm generated further warnings for
the term mirai and found that mirai was mentioned several
times on darkweb forums as well. Indeed, on September 30,
the source code of a software kit exploiting this vulnerability
was released on one of the darkweb forums that the method
constantly monitors.
In the following days, several warnings were generated for
the term mirai, always emphasizing its co-occurrence with
terms such as botnet and iot. In fact, the news of source code
release quickly spread online, through blog posts and news
stories, causing significant online chatter on Twitter and hacker
forums that was promptly detected by our system. Figure 3
shows the timeline of warnings generated for the word mirai.
Summarizing, the algorithm was able to generate warnings
for a vulnerability with a lead time of 49 days before hackers
managed to exploit it to take over thousands of IoT devices
and launch large scale distributed attacks. Moreover, since
October 1—almost three weeks before the main attacks of
October 21, 2016—the warnings were advising that the term
mirai was mentioned on darkweb/deepweb forums where users
were sharing knowledge and source codes to exploit such
a vulnerability, thus indicating that the threat was real and
imminent.
This scenario illustrates the inherent predictability of such
type of cyber attacks: the preparation of these events often oc-
curs in plain sight, discussed on online platforms and publicly-
accessible discussion forums. Our system leverages the human
component that contributes to the attacks’ preparation and
leaves online digital traces behind.
B. Data Breaches
a) AdultFriendFinder.: On November 14, 2016 several
news outlets reported that more than 300M accounts of the
popular adult dating website AdultFriendFinder were exposed
in a massive data breach.
The day before, on November 13, 2016 the algorithm
started to issue several warnings related to the word adult-
friendfinder and associated with terms such as breach, ac-
counts, databreach (see Fig. 4). Our warnings pointed to 6
mentions of adultfriendfinder in darkweb and deepnet forums.
Further inspection of these posts provided information about
how to access to the leaked data, as well as links to market-
places were the leaked data were sold.
b) BrazzersForum.: On September 5, 2016 newspapers
and magazines reported that nearly 800K accounts for popular
adult website Brazzers were exposed in a data breach.
On September 6, 2016 our algorithm generated 4 warnings
related to the word brazzersforum and associated with terms
such as accounts and databreach (see Fig. 5). Initially, the
algorithm did not find any mentions to brazzersforum in
deepnet and darkweb forums, but two days later, on September
8, the algorithm generated additional warnings indicating 65
mentions to brazzersforum in deepnet and darkweb forums.
Such sources, again, provided various forms of access to these
leaked data.
This case demonstrates that some events are more challeng-
ing to predict than others, since the system did not anticipate
the data breach, differently from the AdultFriendFinder case.
However, the method was yet capable of identifying sources
that provide data availability, yielding actionable insights to
analysts and decision makers to limit the damage of cyber-
threats that have already occurred.
V. RELATED WORK
The framework introduced in this paper leverages the
communication of malicious actors on darkweb and deepnet
hacking forums as well as the activity of cyber-security experts
on Twitter.
Previous work analyzed hacker forums to detect threats that
pose great risk to individuals, organizations, and governments.
Research showed that the distribution of information among
users is based on their skill level and reputation [9]–[11].
Still, users disseminate tacit knowledge and share tools such
as malware samples and source codes by simply attaching
them to posted messages [12], [13]. Moreover, knowledge
and methodology is disseminated among hackers in the form
of tutorials either written as text files or in the form of
instructional videos [10]. Many of these tutorials directly
enable readers to launch criminal cyber attacks such as denial
of services, SQL injections, cross-scripting attacks, and more
[14]. Researchers identified the presence of such hacker com-
munities to be common across various geopolitical regions,
including the US, China, Russia, the Middle-East, and other
regions where information technologies are either ubiquitous
or rapidly growing [15], [16].
Previous studies on online social media suggested that Twit-
ter might serve as an important tool to predict future events
in different domains, including earthquake detection [17],
epidemiology [18], [19], and the stock market [20], [21]. In
the security domain, much work has been devoted to Twitter as
object of manipulation and abuse [22], studying the effects of
spam accounts [23], [24], social bots [25], [26], and malicious
campaigns [27]–[31]. Sabottke et al. published the first study
to use social media to identify cyber vulnerabilities [1]; we
pushed this concept further and used security experts and their
Twitter activity as source for cyber-threat anticipation.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a framework that generates
warnings for imminent or current cyber-threats by leverag-
ing unconventional, public data sensors such as Twitter and
the Darknet. The performance evaluation reported in Section
III highlights that our system provides very high discovery
precision, which could be easily improved by adding new
dictionaries (e.g., foreign language dictionaries), enriching the
existent one, and improving the threat dictionary to include
new attacks terms. Indeed, the vast majority of false alarms
reported by the annotators were due to foreign language terms
and terms related to cyber-security yet too generic to be
considered as real threats. The recall of our system may be
improved by expanding the list of monitored experts, and
adding further data sources.
In Section IV, our analysis of the timeline of warnings
pointed out how our algorithm could have allowed orga-
nizations to anticipate and prepare for attacks that caused
wide spread disruptions in fall 2016. In particular, the sys-
tem generated warnings for mirai—the vulnerability that was
exploited—49 days before hackers took over thousands of IoT
devices and unleashed a massive DDoS attack that put the
Internet infrastructure on its knees and disrupted the operations
of hundreds of organizations, including banks and financial
institutions, the entertainment industry, the US government,
and various foreign countries. Furthermore, starting three
weeks before the attack, the warnings were also identifying
that the term mirai was mentioned on darkweb hacker forums,
in association with the availability of software toolkits to
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automate attack operations, stressing out that the threat was
imminent even further.
However, we have noticed that for certain threats, such as
the one related to BrazzersForums, our algorithm is not able to
produce warnings before the actual event occurs. To face this
problem, we are now working on extending our algorithm to
monitor multiple data sources at a time, e.g., Twitter, Darkweb
forums, cyber security related Blogs, etc. This new extension
will allow to generate warnings from several data sources and
thus to detect cyber threat that might be not mentioned in
Twitter or that might be mentioned in other sources earlier
than in Twitter. As an example, by continuously monitoring the
warnings generated by our method we were able to detect the
two major attacks that occurred on May 12th, 2017 and on Jun
27th, 2017 respectively related to the ransomwares Wannacry
and Petya. The method taking Twitter as a primary source
produced the following warnings.
a) Wannacry: 24 warnings related to the word wannacry,
and 7 to wannacrypt were generated on May 12th. However,
by monitoring other sources we have mentions in cyber
security related Blogs of the words wannacry, wannacrypt,
and wcry, which first appear in Apr 18th and that our method
could easily mark as warnings.
b) Petya: : 5 and 3 warnings related to the word petrwrap
(other name for petya) were respectively generated back in
March, 15th and March 21st. This signal disappears in Twitter
until Jun 27th, the day of the cyber attack. The method
was indeed able to generate early warnings related to this
ransomware. However, the use of additional sources could help
to continuously monitor the mentions of a discovered word.
In the present, case we have seen mentions of petwrwrap in
the Darkweb forums both in March and April, 2017.
Future work will be also devoted both to find a baseline
model that could be used to compare the performance of
our algorithm and to develop a method to automatically
annotate the date in which a cyber threat becomes public. This
improvement will enable to further evaluate the algorithm, by
computing the average temporal length of the algorithm to
discover new cyber threats in advance.
Finally, our method is still being improved with the aim
to generate more detailed and informative warnings. Future
versions of the algorithm will include a Natural Language
Processing (NLP) stage aimed at extracting knowledge and
insights from the Darkweb posts mentioning the discovered
terms. In particular, we are developing NLP methods to
recognize entities such as actors (hackers or groups), targets
(organizations, specific sectors, etc.), source codes, etc. We
will consider extending our monitored keyword lists to layman
terms (out-of-service, unavailable, etc., instead of e.g., DDoS),
monitor communities of open-source software developers (e.g.,
Android, Linux, etc.) to timely identify new bugs and vulner-
abilities as they become publicly known.
We plan to leverage computational linguistic methods to
investigate personality traits and socio-cultural traits of users
mentioning the discovered words on darkweb forums: this will
allow us to determine the credibility of a threat based on the
expertise and the intents demonstrated by the actors associated
to it.
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